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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of juvenile delinquency, there is no one cure." To ascribe all acts of juvenile
misconduct to the factor of parental training would seem an oversimplified
and unrealistic view.
JAMES W. JOHNSON.
NEGLIGENCE - GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY - FEDERAL TORTS CLAIM ACT-
Action was brought against the United States for damages to buildings
allegedly caused by nuclear detonations conducted by employees of the
United States. The United States District Court held that in view of coopera-
tion of the legislative and executive departments of the United States in the
firing of atomic devices, no liability could be predicated because of the
explosions themselves, whatever the consequences. Bartholamae Corp. v.
United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957).
The court in the instant case rendered judgment for the government on
the ground that the plaintiff in a negligence case must prove not only that the
employees of the defendant were negligent, but that such negligence, if any,
was the proximate cause of damage.1
The Federal Torts Claim Act provides that the Federal District Courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions on claims against the United
States occurring on and after January 1, 1945, for injury, death or loss of
property caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any govern-
mental employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission oocurred.2 It is important to note, however, that the Act excepts
discretionary duties of governmental employees whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.3 The exception extends not only to agencies of the govern-
ment but to all governmental employees acting within the scope of their
employment. 4 It has even been extended to errors in administration of gov-
ernmental functions.'
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress desired to waive
the government's immunity only for ordinary common law torts.6 It was not
11. Witmer & Herzog, And What About The Parents of Juvenile Delinquents, 19 Fed.
Prob. (1955).
1. Nevada Transfer and Warehouse Co. v. Peterson, 60 Nev. 87, 107, 108, 89 P.2d
8, 99 P.2d 633 (1940). Week v. Reno Traction Co., 38 Nev. 285, 149 Pac. 65 (1915).
2. 60 Stat. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2) (b) (1949).
3. Indeed, it has been so held by those district courts which have dismissed com-
plaints charging negligence, following the government's confession and avoidance plea that
the acts alleged to be culpable fall within the exception. E. g., Boyce v. Uuited States,
93 F. Supp. 866 (1950).
4. Employees of the government includes members of the military or naval forces of
the United States, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity.
63 Stat. 106 (1945), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (Supp. 1956).
5. Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. Rep. No. 5373
and H. R. Rep. No. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1942). Cf. Alzua v. Johnson,
231 U.S. 106 (1913); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914); Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
6. That congressional thought was centered on granting relief for the run-of-the mill
accidents, as distinguished from injury from performing discretionary functions, is indicated
by the message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942 to the 77th Congress recom-
mending passage of a tort claims statute. 88 Cong. Rec. 312-314 (1942).
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contemplated that the government should be subjected to liability arising
from acts of a governmental nature or function.
7
Turning to the interpretation of the Act, the reasoning as applied to this
case should start from the accepted principle that jurisdiction over the
defendant now exists and it remains for the courts, in the exercise of their
discretion, to determine whether any claim is recognizable in law.8 The
Federal Torts Claim Act is an example of the progressive relaxation of the
governmental immunity rnle by legislative enactment. Of course, these modifi-
cations are entitled to a construction that accomplish their aim, 9 that is,
one that will carry out the legislative purpose of allowing suits against the
government for negligence with due regard for the statutory exceptions to
that policy. In interpreting the exceptions to the generality of the grant,
courts include only those circumstances which are within the words and
reason of the exception.o Since the right to sue is obtained from Congress,
that right must necesarily be subjected to such restrictions as Congress has
imposed."
For purposes of this case it is unnecessary to define precisely where dis-
cretion should end. It is enough to hold that a discretionary function or duty
cannot form a basis for suit under the Act." ' Where there is room for policy
judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance
with official directions cannot be actionable.13 If it were not so, the protection
of the Federal Torts Claim Act would fail at the time it would be needed,
that is, when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a casual step, each
action or nonaction being directed by the superior exercising - perhaps
abusing - discretion.14
The Act does not extend to absolute liability without fault.15 It requires
a proof of a negligent act, and liability does not arise by virtue either of
United States ownership of an inherently dangerous commodity or property,
or of its engaging in an extra-hazardous activity."e
Applying the above principles to the instant case it can be said that
negligence alone could found the action. The statute in question specifically so
provides. Of course, the Act has limitations and the government will waive
immunity if injustice would otherwise result.
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7. 86 Cong. Rec. 12021-12022 (1940).
8. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
9. See United States v. Yellow Cab. Co., 340 U.S. 543, 555 (1951).
10. In re Texas City Disaster, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952); Walling v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943); A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493
(1945).
11. Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 251 (1940).
12. There are, of course, American state cases which are premised on a similar policy
judgment, e.g., Barrett v. State of New York, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917);
Goldstein v. State of New York, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939).
13. Street, Tort Liability of the State, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 341, 353 (1949). This
writer seems to indicate that the principle protection for the exercise of official discretion
will come through the accepted principles of the common law as to torts of public officials
acting within their delegated authority.
14. The courts that have passed upon the applications of the Torts Claim Act have
interpreted the exception of discretionary functions, generally, in conformity with the
holding in the present case that authorized governmental activities cannot support
damage suits. See note 2 supra.
15. United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64, 67 (1952) (dictum); Rayonier, Inc., v.
United States, 225 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1955).
16. United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1955).
